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Chemists employed by the police can do remarkable things with blood.
They can find it in shreds of cloth, in the interstices of floor boards, on
the iron of a heel, and can measure it and swear to it and weave it into
a rope to hang a man.
Margery Allingham
The Tiger in the Smoke, 1952
But evidence drawn empirically from facts, though it may justify the
action of the practical man, is not scientifically conclusive.
Beatrice Potter Webb
The Economics of Factory Legislation
Socialism and National Minimum, 1909
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it has been said that "[c]hallenging an expert and questioning his
expertise is the lifeblood of our legal system,"1 the courts are still at a loss when
it comes to deciding what testimony can be heard so that we may put our belief
in the expert. This problem is indicated by 70 years of the courts' using different
admissibility standards regarding what is considered valid scientific evidence
1David L. Bazelon, Dallas Times Herald, May 13, 1973.
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and the expert testimony related to it.2 The courts have created these standards
in attempts to ensure that only valid, supportable and accepted scientific
evidence is admitted at trial, and novel theories, which are less supportable
and have less acceptance within the community, are not admissible as evidence.
A plethora of tests have been advanced since the decision in the 1923 seminal
case, Frye v. United States,3 which originally established the criteria required in
order for the evidence and its supporting testimony to be admitted at trial.
Although these tests attempted to define more clearly what constituted valid
testimony, they merely added additional requirements that were essentially the
same as the sole requirement under the original test. Nevertheless, even with
all the different criteria established by the courts, a uniform test still remains to
be either created or accepted by them.
In 1992, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.4 for the sole purpose of establishing one consistent test in
order to eliminate the discrepancies among the federal courts. Nevertheless,
after discussing in depth what should be the threshold test for the admissibility
of scientific testimony, and setting forth several factors trial courts must weigh
in determining whether to admit the testimony, the Court's decision has the
effect of mere reaffirmation of the original test.
This paper will discuss and analyze the problem of scientific evidence and
expert testimony from Frye v. United States5 to the new grounds for
admissibility established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.6 This note will specifically focus on some of
the changes made by the courts to the common law rule and follow its
transformation to a more liberal standard within the federal court system. The
paper will conclude that the courts have not really changed their position on
the admissibility of scientific evidence and that their current criteria still are
tantamount to the old general acceptance standard.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. The Expert
According to Black's Law Dictionary, an expert is
[o]ne who by reason of education or special experience has knowledge
respecting a subject matter about which persons having no particular
training are incapable of forming an accurate opinion or making a
2 See infra pp. 4-6, 10-21 delineating the different tests used by various courts.
3293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
5293 F. 1013.
6113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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correct deduction; [o]ne who by habits of life and business has peculiar
skill in forming opinion on subject in dispute.7
Experts are usually involved in cases in which the subject-matter is generally
beyond the scope of the average lay-person's knowledge. The expert is used in
order to assist the trier of fact in his or her understanding of the evidence
presented at trial so that the trier of fact will more easily be able to render a
decision regarding the dispute.8
Although experts are generally viewed as being helpful to the resolution of
the dispute presented at trial, some judges still have varying concerns
regarding the use of expert testimony at trial.9 These concerns include "fears
that experts will give opinions they would be unwilling to submit for peer
review, that juries will be unable to determine the scientific issues without
resorting to speculation, and that juries will reach emotional decisions based
on the plight of the plaintiffs."10 Moreover, although courts and commentators
agree that greater control over (the use of) expert witnesses is needed, they
continue to disagree about how to achieve it.11
7 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 578 (6th ed. 1990). See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 800 (1961)
(defining an expert as: "one who has acquired special skill in or knowledge of a
particular subject through professional training or practical experience: [an] authority,
[a] specialist; one having skill or knowledge not possessed by mankind in general.").
8
"Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier.... When opinions are excluded, it is
because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time." FED. R. EvID.
702 advisory committee's note.
9 See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, "Helpful" or "Reasonably Reliable'? Analyzing the
Expert Witness's Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 350,351-52 (January, 1992).
lOId. at 352 (footnotes omitted). Experts have also been criticized for "giving
professional opinions that others in their own professions characterize as 'far-fetched,'
unreliable, and lacking in objectivity." Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with
Firefighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 474
(March 1993). (footnotes omitted).
11McCarthy, supra note 9, at 352-53 (citing Margaret A. Berger, A Relevancy Approach
to Novel Scientific Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 89 (1987) (proposing that Rule 702 be amended
and include theRule 403 balancing test); Paul C. Giannelli, Scientific Evidence: A Proposed
Amendment to Federal Rule 702,115 F.R.D. 102 (1987) (proposing an amendment to Rule
702 whereby expert testimony would not be admissible unless the proponent gave
advance written notice of his intent to use the testimony to the adverse party); Frederic
I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye Dilemma - A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 84 (1987)
(proposing that Rule 702 be amended to provide for 'reliable' evidence); James E. Starrs,
Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence
Rule 702,115 F.R.D. 92 (1987) (proposing an amendment to Rule 702 which requires that
"the theory or technique in question [be] scientifically valid for the purposes for which
it is tendered"); see also Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L.
REV. 595, 611 n.80 (1988) (proposing a modification of Rule 702 that combines the
proposals of Professors Lederer, Berger and Starrs which focus on reliability, relevancy
and validity, respectively). Commenting on the "need for judicial review and control"
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The courts are additionally concerned that experts will say whatever
attorneys direct them to say.12 For the right price, somewhere, there is an expert
for hire who will support whatever theory an attorney and his client need in
order to obtain a favorable verdict.13 This can, and often does, result in a battle
of the experts at trial, with the trier of fact being the ultimate decision-maker.
Nonetheless, the trier of fact needs to be cognizant of the real purpose behind
the testimony of the expert and not be easily misled by the eloquent rhetoric of
the expert.14
B. The "Frye Rule"
Frye v. United States,1 5 decided on December 3,1923, created the standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence and its supporting expert
testimony. James Alphonzo Frye was convicted of second degree murder and
appealed the decision.16 His sole assignment of error was the trial court's
sustaining of an objection by the United States concerning the admissibility of
the testimony regarding a deception test 17 performed on him.18 The Appellate
Black notes that "there is no consensus on how to achieve these objectives." Id. at 598.
Seealso McCarthy at 351 n.1 (citing Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State
and Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U.
L. REV. 731, 738-41 (1989)) ("Survey evidence indicates that 21% of federal judges think
'the rules relating to the qualifications and use of expert witnesses ... should be made
more restrictive.' In complex cases (including toxic torts), 33% of the federal judges favor
making special rules as to who is qualified to testify, while 32% favor special rules as to
what evidence - for example, what statistical evidence - is acceptable.")
12 Chaulk by Murphy v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 808 F.2d 639,644 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Posner,J., dissenting) ("There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd on its face, that
cannot now be proved by some so-called 'experts'." Iquoting Keegan v. Minneapolis &
St. Louis R.R., 78 N.W. 965,966 (Minn. 1899)]). See also Peter Huber, Safety and the Second
Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 333
(1985) ("[A] Ph.D. can be found to swear to almost any 'expert' proposition, no matter
how false or foolish.")
13 Michael H. Graham, Expert Witness Testimony and the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Insuring Adequate Assurance of Trustworthiness, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 45 ("Today
practicing lawyers can locate quickly and easily an expert witness to advocate nearly
anything the lawyers desire."); Jack B. Weinstein, Improving Expert Testimony, 20 U. RICH.
L. REV. 473, 482 (1986) ("An expert can be found to testify to the truth of almost any
factual theory, no matter how frivolous .... Juries and judges can be, and sometimes
are, misled by the expert-for-hire.')
14 See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[S]cientific
proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury
of laymen."); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973) (expert
testimony has an "aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.")
15293 F. 1013.
161d.
17This test is described as the systolic blood pressure deception test. It is claimed
that a person's blood pressure is influenced by and reflects his emotions. It was alleged
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Court for the District of Columbia held that the test had not "gained such
standing and scientific recognition among physiological and psychological
authorities as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony deduced
from the discovery, development, and experiments thus far made"19 and
therefore affirmed the trial court's decision. 20
In rendering its decision, the appellate court recognized that it is difficult to
determine exactly when scientific principles or theories become valid.2 1
Nevertheless, it stated that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."22
In other words, once a scientific theory or principle becomes generally accepted
within the scientific community, it would be considered valid and would
therefore be admissible into evidence at a trial. However, if the theory or
principle was not generally accepted, it would be deemed novel or "junk
science"23 and would not be admissible as evidence. Thus, the theory of general
acceptance, which withstood criticisms, debates and trials for over the next 70
years, was created.
Frye is a brief opinion. Aside from stating the often quoted general
acceptance requirement and holding that the blood pressure deception test had
not attained general acceptance with the proper authorities, the Frye court did
not elaborate on the reasoning behind its decision. The Frye rule was most likely
created to establish a threshold reliability test for the courts to use in
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, the rule has
come to be used or interpreted by the courts as a way of keeping "junk science"
out of the courtroom.
that an analysis of the examinee's blood pressure readings would indicate whether he
is telling the truth or attempting to cover it up. Id.
81d.
19293 F. at 1014.
20Id.
21
"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized . I... Id.
221d.
23 There does not seem to be a precise definition of "junk science." See PETER W. HUBER,
GALILEO°S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 214 (1991). Nevertheless, some
examples of junk science are: breast cancer being caused by a fall from a streetcar and
cancer being aggravated or caused by lifting a box of cheese. Id. at 1. Huber's book
contains a detailed analysis of the evolution and use of novel scientific testimony and
"junk science" in the courtroom. See pages 2 and 3 of his book for a comparison of"junk
science" and real science and "junk science" and liability science, respectively.
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It has been stated that one of the reasons why the "general acceptance"
standard may have been established was to keep supposed "junk science" and
novel scientific theories upon which plaintiffs would base their recoveries out
of the courtroom.24 Another may have been an attempt to prevent, or at least
inhibit, plaintiffs from obtaining sympathy from triers of fact in order to recover
under a "deep-pockets" or a "someone must pay for the injury" theory.25
Although these two theories may not have been conceptualized by the Frye
court, it appears as if subsequent decisions by other courts have interpreted
Frye in this manner and have used it as a broad shield in order to keep cases
based on novel scientific theories or techniques out of the courtroom.26
The principle established by Frye became the basis by which all scientific
evidence and testimony would be measured to determine its admissibility in
court-it became the standard everywhere.2 7 The Frye rule was applied in a
number of cases and was the subject of many articles.28 Although Frye's
"general acceptance" standard was lauded by some courts and commentators
for "its ability to assess novel scientific evidence, [it was also criticized by others
for] its vagueness, its tendency to exclude potentially useful evidence, its
inability to guarantee reliability, and its too generalized focus."29 Furthermore,
Frye's requirement for general acceptance was criticized for causing delays in
the admissibility of potentially reliable evidence.30 Some even argued that by
directing all attention to whether a technique had been generally accepted, the
important issue of whether the analyst applied the proper testing procedure
was lost. 31
241d. at 182-83.
25Id. at 41, 188.
26HUBER, supra note 23.
27Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The 'Bases' of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of
Scientific Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1, 18 (November 1988) ("Frye was the controlling
test in at least forty-five states") (citing Note, Changing the Standard for the Admissibility
of Novel Scientific Evidence: State v. Williams, 40 OHIO ST. LJ. 757, 769 (1979)).
28Di Lello, supra note 10, at 475 (footnotes omitted).
29Jason D. Altman, Comment, Admissibility of Forensic DNA Profiling Evidence: A
Movement Away from Frye v. United States and a Step Toward the Federal Rules of Evidence:
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992), 44
WASH. UJ. URB. & CONTEMp. L. 211,215-16 (Summer/Fall 1993) (footnotes omitted). See,
e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); Paul C. Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Half-Century Later, 80
COLuM. L. REV. 1197,1211 (1980).
3 0 CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 363-64 (1954).
3 1Edward J. lmwinkelried, The Debate in the DNA Cases Over the Foundation for the
Admission of Scientific Evidence: The Importance of Human Error as a Cause of Forensic
Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19,23 (1991).
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C. The Federal Rules Of Evidence
1. Generally
The Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975,32 liberalized the common
law "general acceptance" standard as established in Frye.33 In order for a piece
of evidence to be considered admissible under the Federal Rules, it must be
relevant under Rule 401.34 The relevancy test is typically the first hurdle
evidence must clear before it may be admitted at trial. Nevertheless, "problems
of relevancy call for an answer to the question whether an item of evidence,
when tested by the processes of legal reasoning, possesses sufficient probative
value to justify receiving it in evidence. "35
Notwithstanding the above, relevant evidence may still be excluded on the
grounds of prejudice, confusion or waste of time.36 Circumstances involving
evidence, its relevancy and possible prejudicial effect "call for balancing the
probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result
from its admission."37 While Rule 401 is the first hurdle an item of evidence
must clear before it can be admitted, Rule 403 "provides for judicial scrutiny
32 ActofJan. 2,1975, Pub.L. No. 93-595,88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at28U.S.C.
app. (1988)).
33 McCarthy, supra note 9, at 354 (citing Michael H. Graham, supra note 13, at 43). See
also Faust F. Rossi, Modem Evidence and the Expert Witness, 12 LITIG. 18 (Fall 1985) ("The
welcome mat was rolled out in 1975, when Congress enacted Federal Evidence Rules
702 through 705. These four provisions, comprising only six sentences, confirmed the
judicial trend toward expanded admissibility of expert testimony.").
34 Relevant evidence, defined in Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, is
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "All relevant
evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
35FED. R. EVliD. 401 advisory committee's note. The Federal Rules of Evidence
establish the standard by which evidence is determined to be admissible, while the
Advisory Committee Notes interpret this standard and set an outer limit on how broad
this standard may be applied.
36FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 states: "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." "Unfair prejudice," as
used in Rule 403, is "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." FED. R. EvlD. 403 advisory
committee'snote. This rule was created because of the risks of having a decision be made
on a purely emotional basis, at the one end, to merely wasting time, at the other. Id. See
also In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(stating that exclusion of the testimony under Rule 403 will prevent an extended trial.),
affd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
37FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
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prior to the admission of otherwise relevant evidence."38 Although "[tihe
court's consideration of the reliability of the evidence in determining its
probative value 39 is one of the most difficult parts of Rule 403 to apply, that
consideration is imperative when dealing with expert testimony.
Rule 403 is a powerful rule when dealing with the concept of admissibility
of expert testimony and scientific evidence. This is evidenced by the fact that
some courts have used it to exclude expert testimony that was otherwise
admissible.4 0 One court,4 1 which used a combination of Rule 403 and Rule 703
in order to exclude evidence, stated that "lack of reliable support may render
[the evidence] more prejudicial than probative."42 Nevertheless, some courts
have stated that Rule 403 should not always be used; but when it is, caution
should be exercised. 43
2. The Expert
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, if a person is testifying as an expert,
he may give his opinion if his testimony contains "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue .. "44 A person may be considered an
expert by his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education .. .45 The
rule is broadly phrased to encompass not only experts in the strictest sense (e.g.,
physicians, architects), but also those who are sometimes called "skilled"
witnesses (e.g., bankers, mechanics, [real estate entrepreneurs]). 46
3 8 Kimberly M. Skaggs, Case Comment, Limiting the Admissibility of Expert Testimony:
Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 53 OHio ST. L.J. 1185,1192 (1992).
391d.
40See,e.g., Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156,1160 (4th Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986); see also Anne S. Toker, Note, Admitting Scientific Evidence in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 165, 166-77 (1991).
41Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
421d. at 422.
43United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700,707 (5th Cir.) (stating that "the application of
Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862 (1979); see also DeLuca
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941,957 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that Rule 403
is an unlikely basis for exclusion if testimony survives Rule 702 and Rule 703).
44FED. R. EVID. 702. On the other hand, a lay witness may generally only testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise if the opinion or inference is "a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness and b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's
testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." FED. R. EviD. 701.
45FED. R. EVID. 702.
46FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
[Vol. 8:245
1993-94] EXPERT TESTIMONY AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 253
The expert may base his opinion on "facts or data... perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing."4 7 These facts or data may be
derived from either "firsthand observation, evidence at trial .... facts presented
to the expert outside of the courtroom... [or] even inadmissible hearsay, if
other experts would rely on that type of data in forming an opinion.' 48
It is important to note that Rule 703 does not, by its language, require that
the evidence upon which the expert bases his or her testimony be "generally
accepted" by the scientific community.49 It merely states that "[ilf of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or-inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in
evidenci."50 Furthermore, the comments to the Rule provide that:
[T]he rule is designed to broaden the basis for expert opinions beyond
that current in many jurisdictions and to bring the judicial practice into
line with the practice of the experts themselves when not in court.
Thus[,] a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on
information from numerous sources and of considerable variety...
[from which] [t]he physician makes life-and-death decisions .... His
validation, expertly performed and subject to cross-examination,
ought to suffice for judicial purposes. 51
Later in the same comment, it is stated that "[i]f it be feared that enlargement
of permissible data may tend to break down the rules of exclusion unduly,
notice should be taken that the rule requires that the facts or data 'be of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.'" 52 This hints towards
the general acceptance standard as set forth in Frye.5 3
4 7 FED. R. EVID. 703.
48 Skaggs, supra note 38, at 1190. (footnote omitted).
49 This is, on the face of the rule, in direct contrast to the general acceptance
requirement set forth in Frye.
50 FED. R. EVID. 703 (emphasis added).
51 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
521d.
53 The comment concludes with a reference to an example in which the testimony of
an "accidentologist" regarding the point of impact in an automobile accident would not
be permitted if it was based on the comments of bystanders because experts would not
reasonably rely on this type of information. Id. This seems logical since the
accidentologist would be making a determination and stating his opinion on evidence
conveyed from the bystanders instead of studying the accident scene himself. It is rare
that an expert would even base an opinion on comments from others without doing his
own study and investigation.
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D. Does Frye Still Exist?
A debate continues among both commentators and judges as to whether the
Frye rule is still in existence under the Federal Rules.54 The fact that Frye and
its "general acceptance standard" is not mentioned anywhere in the Federal
Rules of Evidence or the Advisory Committee Notes adds further fuel to the
fire.55 Instead, the Federal Rules appear to use a relevancy approach.56 Some
commentators argue that the omission of Frye from the Federal Rules is
"tantamount to the abandonment of the general acceptance standard,"57 while
others argue that because Frye is not expressly overruled by the Federal Rules,
its "general acceptance" standard remains steadfast.58 The question of Frye's
existence also remains unanswered in the federal courts.5 9 Nevertheless, there
appears to be a movement away from the Frye test and towards the Federal
Rules of Evidence.60
E. The Movement By The Courts Away From Frye
Although the exact case in which the courts first deviated from Frye is not
easily determinable, once the Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted, a greater
54 See Di Lello, supra note 10. and accompanying text. See also supra note 29 and
accompanying text.
55 Compare the Federal Rules of Evidence and accompanying Advisory Committee's
Notes as amended to December 1,1991 (no mention of the Frye rule) with the Committee
Notes from the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence 84, (Aug. 1991) (mentioning Frye
by stating "[t]he rule does not mandate a return to the strictures of Frye v. United States
....."); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed
Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 765-66 (1990). It makes one wonder why, with the
known interpretation and discrepancy problems with the Federal Rules and whether
Frye remains, the Committee did not keep its proposed mention of Frye in the Committee
Notes when it revised the Federal Rules in 1991.
56Skaggs, supra note 38, at 1188.
57David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem
in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REv. LrTic. 117, 126 n.59 (Fall 1990) (quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE § 702[03L at 702-36 (1990)).
58Skaggs, supra note 38, at 1188. See also Giannelli, supra note 29, at 1229.
59Some circuits continue to adhere to Frye. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and remanded, 113 S.
Ct. 2786 (1993); Christophersenv. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106,1115 (5th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v. Two Bulls, 918
F.2d 56,60 (8th Cir. 1990);United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,351 (7th Cir. 1989). Others
have given up the Frye standard in favor of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992);
United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1232 (3d Cir. 1985).
60Aitman, supra note 29, at 215-22.
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number of courts began to create new standards by which evidence would be
determined to be admissible.61
United States v. Williams62 was one of the first cases to deviate from the Frye
rule and establish its own test regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence.
This case, decided three years after the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, demonstrated a growing discontent with the Frye rule and the need
for an improved admissibility standard.63
Williams6 4 involved a challenge to the admissibility of spectrographic voice
identification.65 In the course of rendering its opinion, the court recognized that
"[t]here is no clearly defined, universal, litmus test for the general admissibility
of all 'scientific' evidence."66 Nevertheless, in affirming the admission of the
spectrography evidence,67 the court formulated a five-part test that it used to
determine the reliability and admissibility of the voice analysis.68 These
indicators were: 1) "the potential rate of error" of spectrography analyses,69 2)
"the existence and maintenance of standards" used in the examination
process;70 3) "the care and concern with which a scientific technique has been
61See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); Downing, 753 F.2d 1224; Christophersen 939 F.2d 1106; Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786.
62583 F.2d 1194.
63 See, e.g., Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (applying the test in Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, under
which the Frye rule was held to have been superseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence);
Andrews v. Florida, 533 So.2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to follow Frye, and
favoring the relevancy standard from Downing); State v. Brown, 687 P.2d 751 (Or. 1984)
(rejecting the Frye standard in favor of the Oregon Evidence Code for admissibility
standards for expert testimony); State v. Walstad, 351 N.W.2d 469 (Wis. 1984) (rejecting
the Frye rule in favor of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence governing admissibility of
evidence); Springfield v. State, 860 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1993) (stating the correct approach
for evaluating scientific evidence is through the Wyoming Rules of Evidence rather than
Frye).
64583 F.2d 1194.
651d. at 1195. This was the first time this type of evidence had been challenged in this
circuit. Id. Since the appeal of the co-defendant, Manning, does not have to do with the
admissibility of the voice analysis, it will not be addressed in this Note.
661d. at 1197. In a footnote, the court also acknowledged that the fourth and sixth
circuits have admitted spectrographic voice analysis while the sole circuit finding
otherwise has been questioned. In addition, the court added that the government's brief
listed 19 district courts in favor, and one against, and nine state courts in favor, and four
against. 583 F.2d at 1197 n.6.
671d. at 1201.
681d. at 1198-99.
691d. at 1198.
70583 F.2d at 1198.
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employed, and whether it appears to lend itself to abuse; 71 4) "its analogous
relationship with other types of scientific techniques, and their results,
routinely admitted into evidence; 72 and 5) "the presence of 'failsafe'
characteristics" in the testing procedure.73 This test set the relevancy standard
by which the admissibility of evidence would be measured by many courts. 74
Another case which formulated a new admissibility standard was United
States v. Downing,75 in which the defendant was convicted for mail fraud, wire
fraud and interstate transportation of stolen property.76 The sole issue raised
by the defendant on appeal was that the trial court erred in excluding the
proffered expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness
identification. 7 Although the appellate court agreed, it added that the
admission of such testimony is not automatic, but rather conditional on
fulfilling certain requirements.78 These requirements are that the evidence
must: 1) survive a preliminary screening by the district judge through an in
limine proceeding, using Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to
determine if the evidence will assist the trier of fact and not overwhelm or
mislead it, and 2) "fit," that is, show that part of the scientific evidence does
indeed reveal that the identifications involved may have been inaccurate. 79
In the course of rendering its decision, the court criticized the Frye rule and
subsequently rejected its general acceptance requirement as the sole criterion
upon which evidence would be deemed admissible. 80 Furthermore, it stated
that the extent to which a theory or technique is accepted within the scientific
community would only be one factor that would be considered in deciding
whether to admit the evidence.81
711d. at 1199.
721d.
73/d.
74 Altman, supra note 29, at 214 n.20. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463,
466-67 (4th Cir.) (applying relevancy standard to spectrographic voice analysis), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 511 (D. Md. 1973)
(applying relevancy standard to a polygraph test).
75753 F.2d 1224.
761d. at 1227.
771d. at 1226. The appellate court stated that the case presented an issue of first
impression for that circuit and phrased the issue as: "Whether Fed. R. Evid. 702 permits
a defendant in a criminal prosecution to adduce, from an expert in the field of human
perception and memory, testimony concerning the reliability of eyewitness
identifications." Id.
78753 F.2d at 1226.
79/d.
801d. at 1237.
811d. (emphasis added).
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In addition, the court stated that "[tihe language of Fed. R. Evid. 702, the
spirit of the Federal Rules of Evidence in general, and the experience with the
Frye test" gave rise to a need for a more flexible approach towards the
admissibility of scientific evidence.8 2 The court then proceeded to set forth its
own admissibility test for scientific evidence, using Rule 702 as its basis.83 The
court's test would guide the lower courts on how to apply the preliminary
screening process. It advocated, although not exclusively,
a preliminary inquiry focusing on 1) the soundness and reliability of
the process or technique used in generating the evidence, 2) the
possibility that admitting the evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or
mislead the jury, and 3) the proffered connection between the scientific
research or test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual
issues in the case.
84
Moreover, the court added that in cases in which scientific evidence is not
generally accepted or does not have a "track record,"85 there are additional
factors that the court may consider in determining the reliability of the
evidentiary testimony.86 Among these factors are:
the 'novelty' of the new technique, . . ., [t]he existence of a specialized
literature dealing with the technique, .... [t]he qualifications and
professional stature of expert witnesses,. . . the non-judicial uses to
which the scientific technique are put,..., [t]he frequency with which
a technique leads to erroneous results, .... the type of error generated
by a technique, ... [and] tak[ing] judicial notice of expert testimony
that has been offered in earlier cases to support or dispute the merits
of a particular scientific procedure.
87
The court concluded that the district court erred in not applying a proper test
to determine the admissibility of the expert testimony concerning the
unreliability of eyewitness identification 88 and therefore vacated and
remanded the decision to the district court so that it could properly determine
the evidence's admissibility.89
82753 F.2d at 1237.
8 3 1d.
84id.
851d. at 1238.
86753 F.2d at 1238.
871d. at 1238-39.
881d. at 1232.
891d. at 1244.
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Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corporation,90 established yet a third
admissibility standard 9l by combining the Federal Rules of Evidence with the
test set forth in Frye.92 The court broke down the guidelines into a four-part
test.
1) whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion; 2)
whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are
relied upon by other experts in the field; 3) whether in reaching his
conclusion the expert used a well-founded methodology; and 4)
assuming the expert's testimony has passed Rules 702 and 703, and the
Frye test, whether under Fed. R. Evid. 403 the testimony's potential for
unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.93
The court added that these were only suggested questions to be asked by the
trial court; they were not to be applied "mechanically."94
In elaborating on its new test, the court stated that the first three steps were
threshold requirements which all expert testimony needed to meet before it
would be determined to be admissible. 95 In addition, the court stated that the
fourth requirement "provides an overlay-a final mechanism for screening out
otherwise admissible testimony whose potential for prejudice substantially
outweighs its probative value."9 6 The court applied its test to the facts of the
case and affirmed the district court's exclusion of the expert testimony
regarding plaintiff's attempt to establish medical causation since the testimony
was either not sufficiently reliable or more prejudicial than probative. 97
One of the most recent formulations of a new admissibility standard was
created in United States v. Jakobetz,98 which dealt with the admissibility of DNA
profiling evidence.99 The DNA analysis was performed by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation by comparing a blood sample of the defendant with a semen
sample taken from a vaginal swab of the female victim allegedly raped and
90939 F.2d 1106.
91 d. at 1110.
92 d. (Commenting that a combination of the two "provide[s] a framework for trial
judges struggling with proffered expert testimony.") The court also acknowledged that
"[t]he signals are not neatly-cabined categories, and we disentangle them only to accent
the independent significance of each." Id.
93939 F.2d at 1110. (citations omitted).
941d.
95 d.
961d.
97939 F.2d at 1108.
98955 F.2d 786.
99 d. at 789. Although Jakobetz was convicted of kidnapping, it appears as though
the DNA analysis was conducted in order to determine whether the defendant was the
man who allegedly raped and kidnapped the victim.
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kidnapped by him.0 0 A pretrial hearing on a motion in limine was conducted
in order to determine the admissibility of the DNA profiling evidence. 101 After
eight days and testimony from nine experts, five for the prosecution and four
for the defense, the judge credited the testimony of the government's witnesses
and determined that the evidence was sufficiently reliable to be presented to
the jury.102 The defendant was subsequently convicted of kidnapping103 and
appealed the admissibility of the DNA evidence.104
In analyzing the district court's opinion, the circuit court noted that the
district court first looked to the Williams test, and then took other factors into
consideration before rendering its decision.105 These additional factors
included:
1) the experts' qualifications and stature; 2) the existence of specialized
literature; 3) the novelty of the technique and its relationship to more
established areas of scientific analysis; 4) whether the technique has
been generally accepted by experts in the field; 5) the nature and
breadth of the inference adduced; 6) the clarity with which the
technique may be explained; 7) the extent to which basic data may be
verified by court and jury; 8) the availability of other experts to
evaluate the technique; and 9) the probative significance of the
evidence.
10 6
Stating that the district court did a very thorough analysis regarding -the
admissibility of the evidence and did not err in rendering its decision, 107 the
circuit court applied its test and held that it was proper to admit the DNA
profiling evidence.108
in three of these cases the scientific evidence was admitted, while in only one
was it not admitted. In each case, the court deviated from the Frye rule in an
apparent attempt to create a more thorough test to apply in determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, even with these more liberal
standards, one court would not admit the scientific evidence. Moreover, there
was not one set standard or test by which the courts determined whether the
evidence would be admissible. Each court created its own admissibility test or
lOOId.
1011d.
102955 F.2d at 789.
1031d.
1041d. This was not the sole issue raised on appeal by the defendant, but it is the one
which deals with the subject matter of this note.
105Id. at 797.
106955 F.2d at 797-98.
10 7 d. at 799.
108 Id. at 789.
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derived its test from another decision. This fact notwithstanding, a close
reading and comparison of the four tests in the aggregate shows that all of the
tests are essentially the same.
In essence each of the tests formulated by the courts in Williams, Downing,
Christophersen, and Jakobetz attempted to address identical concerns. Each court
made an effort to ensure the intrinsic reliability of the technique, both in terms
of its falsifiability as well as the conduct of the specific test in question.
Furthermore, the courts in Williams and Downing indicated that the
technique would be judged in part by its analogy to techniques admitted in
other cases, a traditional legal analysis that can be assumed to underlie the
reasoning in Christophersen and Jakobetz as well. Additionally, two of the courts
explicitly mentioned legal relevance as a consideration and three of the courts
directed the lower court's attention to prejudice to the jury. Again, these latter
two concerns are raised with the admission of any evidence, expert or
otherwise, and hence add very little to the Frye rule. It must be assumed that
the Frye court in 1923 was equally concerned with precedent, legal relevance
and undue prejudice to the jury's decision-making process.
Finally, Downing, Christophersen, and Jakobetz enumerated general
acceptance within the scientific community as a requirement to admissibility.
Downing and Jakobetz additionally referred to "the existence of specialized
literature" on the technique while Christophersen discussed the requirements
that the expert's testimony be based upon a "well-founded methodology" and
facts which are usually relied on by experts in the field.
The conclusion is inescapable that, whatever these courts say about the
viability of Frye, and however they choose to frame the test they wish the lower
courts to use, they in fact are engaging in an attempt to make the Frye rule work,
while reminding the trial courts that there are additional, perhaps equally
important, factors to be considered.
Furthermore, even though the Frye rule was specifically mentioned in some
of the tests, it was and is being used less and less frequently by the courts.109
In some cases, it was even explicitly ignored or rejected.110 This gives the
impression that Frye is falling out of favor with the courts and that a new test
is desired when a determination has to be made on whether scientific evidence
is admissible.
F. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The fact that each federal court had formulated its own test for admissibility
of scientific evidence resulted in the Supreme Court's granting certiorari111 in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.112 By deciding this case, the
109See, e.g., Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786; Springfield, 860 P.2d 435.
110 See, e.g., Andrews, 533 So.2d 841; Brown, 687 P.2d 751.
111113 S. Ct. 320.
112113 S. Ct. 2786.
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Supreme Court hoped to establish a proper standard by which scientific
testimony would be judged and thereby eliminate such divisions and
discrepancies among the circuits as currently existed. 113
Daubert was one of a group of cases brought against a number of
manufacturers of the drug Bendectin. 114 In Daubert, Petitioners claimed that
Bendectin was a teratogen 115 that caused birth defects in children if it was
ingested by their mothers during pregnancy. In the district court, Respondent,
Merrell Dow, moved for summary judgment claiming that the drug did not
cause birth defects and that Petitioners would be unable to come up with any
admissible proof that it did. 116 In support of its motion, Merrell Dow submitted
an affidavit from its expert witness1 17 which stated that upon his review of
literature and studies on the matter, he did not find Bendectin to be a
teratogen.118
In response, Petitioners submitted testimony of eight experts119 each of
whom concluded that Bendectin did cause birth defects. 120 These conclusions
113Compare, United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54,59-60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (applying the
"general acceptance" standard), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987), with DeLuca, 911 F.2d
941,955 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the "general acceptance" standard).
114 Bendectin was a prescription drug prescribed solely for the treatment of nausea
and vomiting during a woman's pregnancy. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570,571 (S.D. Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and
retnanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). These suits were typically product liability actions for
birth defects of the children resulting from the taking of Bendectin during the mother's
pregnancy. See, e.g., DeLuca by DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 791 F.
Supp. 1042 (D. NJ. 1992), affd, 6 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 691 (1994);
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1046 (1990); In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc., Benedectin Products Litigation, 624 F.
Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), affd, In re Bendectin Litigation, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied sub. nom., Hoffman v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 488 US. 1006
(1989); Watson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1985).
115A teratogen is "an agent or factor that causes the production of physical defects in
the developing embryo." DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1672 (27th ed.
1988).
116113 S. Ct. at 2791.
117Doctor Lamm, who received both his master's and doctor of medicine degrees from
the University of Southern California, has served as a consultant in birth defect
epidemiology and has published numerous articles. Id. at 2791 n.1.
118Id. at 2791.
119Petitioner's experts consisted of a licensed and accredited veterinarian; a specialist
in developmental biology; a medical doctor with specialties in pediatrics, clinical
pharmacology and toxicology; an epidemiologist and biostatistician; a specialist in
biostatistics, epidemiology and biometry; an associate professor of pediatrics and
pharmacology and toxicology; a specialist in pathology and pharmacology; and a
professor of pharmacology. 727 F. Supp. at 574-75. For a complete discussion of these
experts, refer to the aforementioned pages of the decision.
120113 S. Ct. at 2791.
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
were based upon "in vitro" (test tube) and "in vivo" (live) animal studies,
pharmacological studies and the "reanalysis" of previously published
epidemiologicall 2l (human statistical) studies.122
The district court granted Merrell Dow's motion, concluding that
Petitioners' evidence was not "sufficiently established to have general
acceptance in the field in which it belongs. 123 The court reasoned that since
there was a plethora of epidemiological data regarding Bendectin, 124 expert
opinion testimony that is not based on epidemiological evidence is not
admissible to establish causation.125 It further reasoned that epidemiological
evidence is the best evidence of causation in areas such as the one at hand. 126
The court continued that expert opinion which is not based on epidemiology
is not admissible since it is insufficient under the foundation requirements of
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.127 In addition, the court stated that
Petitioners' evidence was not admissible because the recalculations upon
which their experts based their opinions had neither been published nor
subjected to peer review.128 Furthermore, it was determined that the
animal-cell studies, live-animal studies, and chemical-structure analyses could
not by themselves raise a reasonably disputable jury issue concerning
causation.129
The circuit court affirmed 130 citing Frye and declaring that expert opinion
testimony 'based on a methodology that diverges 'significantly from the
procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field ... cannot be shown
to be 'generally accepted as a reliable technique. '" '131 The court reasoned that
Petitioners' reanalysis evidence significantly diverged from the traditional
121Epidemiology is "the science concerned with the study of the factors determining
and influencing the frequency and distribution of disease, injury, and other
health-related events and their causes in a defined human population for the purpose
of establishing programs to prevent and control their development and spread."
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 112, at 566.
122113 S. Ct. at 2791-92.
1231d. at 2792 (citing 727 F. Supp. at 572 [quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508,
510 (9th Cir. 1978)]).
124This is the information upon which Respondent's expert relied. 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
125 Id. at 2792.
126727 F. Supp at 575.
12 7 1d.
128113 S. Ct. at 2792.
1291d.
130951 F.2d 1128.
1311d. at 1130 (quoting United States v. Solomon, 753 F.2d 1522,1526 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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general acceptance process and furthermore, was "unpublished, not subjected
to the normal peer review process and generated solely for use in litigation."132
Moreover, the court concluded that Petitioners' evidence did not provide
sufficient support to permit the testimony of its experts that the drug caused
the birth defects, and therefore, Petitioners would not be able to satisfy their
burden of proving causation at trial.133
Before the Supreme Court, Petitioners did not argue that the Frye rule was
misapplied, but rather that it was superseded by the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence and, therefore, the Court should apply a more liberal
standard when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. 13 4 The
Court agreed with this contention,135 created its own test for admissibility,136
and vacated and remanded the decision to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion.137
In reaching its decision, the Court stated that "the Rules occupy the field"138
and, although the common law could aid in the application of the Rules, "[i]n
principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. 'All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided .... ,"139 It
appears as if the Court is being inconsistent with that statement in light of 1)
previous federal court decisions using the common law general acceptance test
and 2) the Court's own decision in Daubert, which still permits general
acceptance as one of the standards that may be met, despite the existence of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.
Moreover, the Court noted that there was a specific rule that applied to the
issue presented in Daubert-Rule 702.140 It added that neither the Rules nor
their Notes mention the Frye rule or "general acceptance" as a requirement for
admissibility.141 Finally, the Court stated that there was no mention of Frye in
the drafting history of the Rules and "a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement
would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general
approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony.'"'142
132951 F.2d at 1131.
13 3 1d.
134113 S. Ct. at 2793.
1351d. at 2793, 2794 n.6.
1361d. at 2796-97.
1 3 71d. at 2799.
138113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49 (1984)).
139113 S. Ct. at 2794 (citing (Professor Cleary) Abel, 469 U.S. at 51).
140113 S. Ct. at 2794.
141Id.
142Id. (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153,169 (1988) [citing Rules 701
to 7051).
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The Court then proceeded through an exhaustive analysis of Rule 702,143
and noted that there are no certainties in science. 144 However, the Court stated
that
in order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good grounds," based on
what is known.... [T]he requirement that an expert's testimony
pertain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability.
145
After indicating that in cases involving scientific evidence, the evidentiary
reliability would be based on scientific validity,146 the Court stated that its
general observations concerning the admissibility of the evidence were not
intended to be a "definitive checklist or test."14 7 Rather, these factors were
intended to bear on the inquiry into the admissibility of the evidence. 148
The Court enumerated four considerations in determining the admissibility
of the evidence. First, a court must ask whether the scientific theory or
technique "can be (and has been) tested."149 Second, a court must ask "whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication."150
Third, in cases involving a particular scientific technique, an inquiry needs to
be made regarding "the known or potential rate of error" and "the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation."151 Finally,
"general acceptance" can (still) have a bearing on the examination.152
Even though the Court created this four-part evidence admissibility test, it
left the application of it to the district court on remand. The district court should
not have a difficult time in applying the test since it is fairly straightforward
and relatively easy to do. Given the information that appears in the Daubert
opinions from the district court to the Supreme Court, the application of the
four part test to the facts of the case should result in the evidence being
admitted. The Petitioners' theory/technique was tested; it was subject to peer
143113 S. Ct. 2795-96.
1 44 1d. at 2795.
1 4 51d. In a footnote, the Court distinguished between validity, whether "the principle
supports what it purports to show," and reliability, whether "application of the principle
produces consistent results." Id. n.9.
146113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9.
14 71d. at 2796.
1481d.
14 91d.
150113 S. Ct. at 2797.
151id.
1521d.
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review, but not publication; an inquiry may be made regarding the potential
rate of error and the standards used in controlling the technique's operation;
and, it has been generally accepted (by at least eight experts).
While the Court's decision finally put to an end the question of whether the
Frye rule still existed in the federal court system, and although the court stated
that the list of factors was not exclusive, it is not completely clear if all four of
the conditions need to be satisfied or if it would be sufficient to fulfill one or
two of them. It appears as if the Court attempted to clarify the old general
acceptance standard as set forth in Frye, but failed to do so. Rather than having
just one requirement that must be met, the Court created four guidelines to be
used by the lower courts in rendering their decisions. Essentially, all four of the
new standards constitute general acceptance by the scientific community. In
order for a scientific theory or method to be generally accepted by the scientific
community, it would seem logical that the elements set forth in Daubert would
have been met in the first place.
G. Post-Daubert
Although Daubert is a recent decision, a number of courts have cited it in
their opinions, particularly in those cases dealing with expert testimony and
scientific evidence. 153
In United States v. Bonds,154 the defendants were convicted of conspiracy and
federal firearms offenses.155 The circuit court upheld the district court's
admission of the DNA evidence used to prove the conspiracy.1 56 The court
applied Daubert to determine that the DNA evidence and expert testimony met
the test adopted by the Supreme Court.157 The court held that "the expert
testimony meets the 'relevance' prong of the admissibility test: that the
evidence or testimony 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
153 See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Laboratories, Inc., 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993) (deciding
that even though the district court did not use Daubert, it anticipated it, and the district
court made the correct decision regarding expert testimony based on the Daubert
standards); Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054 (V.I. 1993) (applying the teachings
of Daubert in deciding that DNA profiling process is relevant, reliable and admissible);
Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Products, 826 F. Supp. 677 n.1
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that Daubert supported the court's decision to admit the expert
testimony); State v. Foret, 628 So.2d 1116 (La. 1993) (adopting the Daubertconsiderations
in rendering its decision on expert testimony); State v. Futch, 860 P.2d 264 (Or. Ct. App.
1993) (deciding that its analysis is consistent with the holding of Daubert). But see State
v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152 (Az. 1993) (leaving the application of Daubert foranother day and
instead applying the Frye rule), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1578 (1994).
15412 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993).
155]d. at 546.
156/d. at 547.
1571d. at 557.
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determine a fact in issue."'158 In addition, the court rejected the defendant's
contention that a different result would have been reached using the DNA
analysis had a different method been used.159 The court disposed of that
argument by stating that since "Daubert requires only scientific validity for
admissibility, not scientific precision,"160 the methodology applied was proper.
Throughout the course of its analysis, the circuit court repeatedly cited to
Daubert and the Supreme Court's rationale in rendering its decision. 161 It
applied the non-exclusive four-prong test set forth in Daubert to the facts before
it and determined that the test was satisfied.162 The court concluded that the
"methodology was valid in that it'result[ed] from sound and cogent reasoning,'
was "'well grounded or justifiable [and] applicable to the matter at hand," and
thus "clearly had 'a grounding in the methods and procedures of science' and
was based on 'more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation."163
Interestingly, the Bonds decision would remain the same regardless of the
standard used to determine the admissibility of the evidence. First, DNA
evidence has been held admissible in prior cases164 and second, the Bonds court
referred to and agreed with Williams, Downing, and Jakobetz and their respective
tests in the course of rendering its opinion. The only case not mentioned was
Christophersen, but it may be inferred that since the evidence would probably
have been admitted under Downing, it would have also been admitted under
Christophersen.
In United States v. Amador-Galvan,165 the defendants raised on appeal the
question whether the district court erred in denying their motion to admit
expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony.166 The
Amador-Galvan court, in reversing the trial court, determined that that court did
not consider whether the proffered expert testimony met the requirements set
forth in Daubert.167 The court stated that the "[tiestimony attacking the
reliability of eyewitness testimony is clearly relevant to [the] ... defense, [since]
it is his main line of defense."168 Although the Amador-Galvan court did not
itself apply Daubert, it did recognize that the exclusion of the expert testimony
15812 F.3d at 557.
1591d. at 558.
160 d.
161 d. at 554-68.
16212 F.3d at 565.
163 d. (citations omitted).
164See, e.g., Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786.
1659 F.3d 1414 (9th Cir. 1993).
1661d. at 1417.
1671d.
1681d. at 1418.
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under the Frye test was error on the part of the district court.169 On remand,
the district court "should decide whether such testimony is relevant, and if so,
whether the theory propounded is trustworthy and scientifically valid" and
therefore admissible under the Daubert standard.170
Even in the absence of Daubert, the circuit court's decision in Amador-Galvan
would remain the same since the facts of that case are similar to those in
Downing, a pre-Daubert case, which found the expert testimony concerning the
reliability of eyewitness identification to be admissible into evidence.
Furthermore, if the expert testimony would have been admissible under
Downing, it would have been admissible regardless of which test was used.
Il. CONCLUSION
As these cases indicate, Daubert is becoming the standard by which courts
determine whether or not to admit expert testimony. Nevertheless, Daubert still
raises some questions regarding the admissibility of scientific evidence and
expert testimony.
An initial concern deals with the first consideration set forth by the
Court-whether the scientific theory or technique "can be (and has been)
tested."171 It is not clear whether the Court is stating that the theory or technique
need only be testable (falsifiable) or that the theory actually be tested. This
question is not answered in the decision. The Court appears to either leave the
resolution of this ambiguous requirement to the trial courts or postpone its
decision until later.172 One can only guess as to how other courts will interpret
this. The failure of the Court to explicitly state a concrete requirement shows
that it is hesitant to make a final decision regarding admissibility standards.
Furthermore, although general acceptance is not the sole criterion for
admissibility under the new standards, it remains as one of the conditions that
may be satisfied in order for evidence to be admissible. This appears to directly
contradict the Court's statement that the "austere standard" of making "general
acceptance the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony" as
required under Frye, "should not be applied in federal trials" since it is both not
included in, and incompatible with, the Federal Rules of Evidence. 173
1699 F.3d at 1418.
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172Nevertheless, the Court did elaborate on the second requirement and expand on
its meaning. It stated that "Ip]ublication... is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does
not necessarily correlate with reliability," and recognized that some theories or
techniques will be "too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published."
Id. at 2797. In addition, it stated that submitting the proposition to the scientific
community is a key element of "good science" since it "increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Id. This will give the lower courts
an indication of what the Supreme Court was attempting to convey in its decision.
173/d. at 2794.
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Notwithstanding that fact, what would happen in a trial if the general
acceptance condition was the only one satisfied? Since the Court has stated that
the four-part test established in Daubert was not exhaustive, one would believe
that evidence which only satisfies the general acceptance requirement should
be admitted. If this is true, Daubert is only one more attempt to clarify the Frye
rule.
In addition, since general acceptance is still permitted as one of the
guidelines by which expert scientific testimony may be admitted, a question
arises as to whether Daubert really solved the problem of defining general
acceptance. The Court merely circumvented the issue. General acceptance is
neither clearly defined in the Court's decision nor discussed in any detail.174
The Court simply states that it "can yet have a bearing on the inquiry."175 But
what is general acceptance and when does it occur in the mind of the Supreme
Court? The Court has failed to articulate a concrete answer to this question.
Furthermore, the Court has left unresolved whether the scientific evidence has
to be accepted by five, ten or one hundred scientists. Or whether it has to be
accepted in one country, two countries, or worldwide. As is evident from the
above, the problem surrounding general acceptance still exists. The problem
with Daubert is that the Court was attempting to address and solve a dilemma,
yet it did not address anything at all.
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174But see Bonds, 12 F.3d at 561 (stating "general acceptance exists when a substantial
portion of the pertinent scientific community accepts the theory, principles, and
methodology underlying scientific testimony because they are grounded in scientific
principles").
175113 S. Ct. at 2797.
1 76 The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Deborah Klein for her
unyielding assistance and advice in the writing and editing of this Note.
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